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 Abstract 
 
This paper reviews the critical issues concerning the establishment of a global 
system of labor standards. Global labor standards have gained a renewed 
prominence in policy debates with the rise of the new international division of 
labor, in which developing countries are producing an ever-increasing share of 
the world’s manufactured exports. This paper takes a close look at the research 
and theories that inform the current debates. In particular, it summarizes the 
arguments in support of global standards, evaluates the threat of unintended 
negative consequences, examines gender-specific issues relating to low-wage 
labor and informal employment, and discusses past and present developments in 
implementation strategies. 
 
Introduction 
 
 Over the past four decades, a fundamental restructuring of international 
production has taken place, a transformation which is frequently referred to as the “new 
international division of labor”. Developing countries have been shifting from exporting 
primary goods and raw materials to also exporting manufactured goods and intermediate 
inputs. The expansion of manufactured exports from the developing world has unleashed 
new competitive pressures. Not only are the newly industrializing economies competing 
with more established industrial powers, they also compete with each other. In this 
environment of heightened competition, individual countries acting alone find it 
increasingly difficult to sustain social protections that raise factor prices – most notably 
wages and other payments to labor. As these trends have become more pronounced, 
international concern over fundamental human rights at work, the payment of poverty 
wages, and the existence of dangerous working conditions has intensified.  
 
Recent evidence shows that, in the developing world, approximately 25 percent of 
people engaged in paid labor live in households that survive on less than the equivalent of 
US$1 per person, per day (Majid 2001). Moreover, setting a more accurate poverty line 
for these countries would raise this estimate of the working poor population significantly 
(Reddy and Pogge 2002). The widespread incidence of poverty wages among working 
people around the world today is indicative of a more general prevalence of unhealthy, 
dangerous, and indecent working conditions. In recent years, calls for a coordinated 
system of global labor standards have gained strength in order to address the problem. 
The following paper takes a close look at the debates surrounding global labor standards. 
In particular, it summarizes the key arguments in support of global labor standards, 
evaluates the threat of negative consequences that could spring from such regulations, 
and discusses current developments in implementation strategies.  
 
 
The labor standards debate: a summary of the key issues 
 
One of the most prevalent arguments as to why a coordinated approach to global 
labor standards is necessary is that it prevents a “race to the bottom”. That is, upward 
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harmonization of standards stops competitive pressures from reducing labor protections 
to their lowest common denominator. According to this logic, global integration creates a 
situation in which the deterioration of basic standards is rewarded by increased 
competitiveness and profitability. In the absence of international cooperation, individual 
countries cannot raise labor standards without jeopardizing their competitive advantage. 
The scenario represents the typical prisoner’s dilemma problem – countries will adopt the 
same low standards, even if social welfare falls below its potential maximum.  Because of 
this, competitive advantages derived from weak labor standards are frequently seen as 
“unfair” competition, since international cooperation in the form of global standards 
could produce a better outcome (Sengenberger 1994).  
 
 The suboptimal outcomes associated with a race to the bottom occur because the 
competitive erosion of labor standards generates external costs that reduce social well-
being. These negative externalities can arise when individuals and their labor are treated 
as any other commodity to be exchanged on unregulated markets.1 The notion that labor 
should not be subjected to the unfettered machinations of a liberal market economy has 
given theoretical life by economic thinkers such as Marx and Polanyi. For example, Marx 
warned that the commodification of labor would lead to the alienation of the working 
population from the functioning of the economy, with substantial human and social costs. 
Similarly, Polanyi (1944) argued that subjecting labor to unregulated market forces 
would generate external costs – including health problems, a deterioration of family and 
community structures, an erosion of craft standards, and a general degradation of many 
aspects of public and private life. According to Polanyi (1944, 1957), labor markets 
should be embedded in the larger society and must be governed by rules, norms, and 
ethical standards that make allowance for the hidden costs of marketization.  
 
In addition to arguing that labor standards protect valuable non-market aspects of 
society, some proponents have justified them in terms of economic efficiency (Palley, 
Drake, and Lee 1999, Buchele and Christensen 1995). According to this line of 
reasoning, labor standards support better labor relations, cooperation on the job, and 
sharing of information – factors which would enhance productivity. In addition, better 
standards, including higher wages, could pay for themselves through efficiency wage 
effects that increase effort on the job (Goldstein, Veum, and Darity 2000, Huang et al. 
1998, Levine 1992, Shapiro and Stiglitz 1984). However, additional empirical research is 
needed to document whether and under what conditions higher standards will exhibit 
these benefits in an international context. 
 
Moreover, there is a theoretical problem with this argument: if higher standards 
are profitable, then why do employers fail to adopt them? One answer is that multiple 
equilibria exist and employers fall into low-wage, low-productivity traps. A policy 
intervention is necessary to move the labor market onto the high-road of greater 
efficiency. Alternatively, substandard employment might arise from a focus on short-term 
gains while ignoring long-term dynamic efficiencies. For example, the use of child labor 
could maximize short-term profits despite the low productivity of the very young. 
                                                 
1    The International Labor Organization (ILO) adopted the stance that labor was not a commodity in its 
1946 Declaration of Philadelphia. The Declaration was attached as an appendix to the ILO constitution. 
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However, keeping children out of school could be inefficient in the long-run since it 
means foregoing the future benefits of greater accumulation of human capital and higher 
productivity (Basu 1999). Finally, the productivity-enhancing effects of higher wages can 
extend beyond the point of profit maximization. That is, additional productivity gains can 
be achieved through higher wages even though individual firms do not have an incentive 
to pay the larger premium.  
 
 Labor standards could also produce faster growth due to their macroeconomic, not 
microeconomic, impact. A coordinated system of standards that increase labor’s 
bargaining power will redistribute income towards workers. Higher labor incomes could 
raise global demand and yield faster growth (Marshall 1994). This is particularly likely to 
be true for economies whose institutional setting and complementary economic policies 
support a regime of “wage-led growth”, in which higher domestic wages are able to raise 
aggregate demand (Stanford 1998). Others have reversed the logic and argued that more 
expansionary macroeconomic policies will produce an environment conducive to 
improving international labor standards (Singh and Zammit 2000, Amsden 1994). In this 
case, faster growth raises labor standards, not vice versa. 
 
 The arguments in favor of a system of global standards must be evaluated against 
warnings as to the potential dangers. In general, most arguments against global labor 
standards claim they will trigger unintended consequences that will end up hurting the 
very people the policies aim to help. For example, eliminating child labor could 
encourage child prostitution. Raising wages could cost jobs. Stricter enforcement could 
cause firms to relocate. In short, global labor standards create market distortions that 
reduce economic well-being due to an inefficient allocation of resources. 
 
 The most common variant of this theme is the argument that global standards 
compromise the competitive position of those developing countries with an abundance of 
low-skill, low-wage labor (Bhagwati 1995, Corden and Vousden 2001). This loss of 
competitive advantage means fewer jobs and scarcer economic opportunities for poor 
workers with few skills. On the flip side, such protections shield workers in more affluent 
economies from global competition. In effect, there is a redistribution of wage income 
from developing to developed economies. Because of this, organizations advocating for 
better labor standards on a global scale have been accused of pushing an agenda of 
disguised protectionism (Bhagwati 2002: 47-90). Others have emphasized the relative 
importance of job opportunities over job quality for poor families in developing countries 
(Krugman 1998, Kristof 2002). They argue that, in the stark reality of the global 
economy, poverty-level wages and substandard employment represent an improvement 
over the next-best options in labor-surplus economies.   
 
 Others advance the position that, with complete markets, no externalities, and 
costlessly enforceable contracts, global labor standards will create a dead-weight welfare 
loss (Brown, Deardorff, and Stern 1996). However, this efficiency argument depends on 
perfect markets being able to seamlessly map shifts in relative factor prices onto the 
output prices of tradable goods and services in order to achieve Pareto optimal outcomes. 
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The introduction of market imperfections, externalities, or multiple equilibria 
dramatically changes this picture. 
 
 The idea that higher labor incomes support growth at the macroeconomic level 
has also been questioned. In the case of a small open economy, it is not always clear that 
a redistribution of income towards labor creates higher levels of aggregate demand 
(Bowles and Boyer 1995). Wage income can be leaky in an economy with a strong 
propensity to import. Furthermore, insofar as investment responds positively to 
profitability, then standards that raise labor costs could have a dampening effect on 
investment, aggregate demand, and ultimately growth. Of course, if standards were 
enforced internationally, then global aggregate demand would rise as standards improve. 
However, small, open economies that compete for external sources of aggregate demand 
might still be characterized as profit-led, since higher unit labor costs undermine their 
ability to sell on global markets (Amsden 1997). 
 
 Finally, there are non-economic considerations that should be taken into account – 
in particular, the political process by which the standards are developed. If the movement 
for global standards is primarily an outcome of concerns raised only by advanced 
industrialized economies, then the justification for these standards to be foisted upon 
developing nations becomes questionable, particularly if such standards are not 
considered to be part of the body of commonly accepted international law. Under these 
conditions, charges of “aggressive unilateralism” and “disguised protectionism” carry 
additional weight (Alston 1996). Similar concerns surface in proposals that delegate 
responsibility for labor standards to global governance institutions (e.g. the World Bank 
or the World Trade Organization) in which the balance of power tilts in favor of the 
world’s rich countries.  
 
 
Gender dynamics and informalization 
 
With the new international division of labor, women frequently account for the 
majority of the labor in low-income sectors producing manufactured exports. Lower 
wages for women have supported demand for their labor in highly mobile, labor-
intensive industries. These developments have been linked to a reduction in average job 
quality that has accompanied a growth in women’s labor force participation – a 
phenomenon that has been termed “global feminization” (Standing 1989). However, it is 
also important to recognize that, since labor markets around the globe remain segregated 
by gender, the growth in women’s share of low-wage employment also results from an 
expansion of jobs typically dominated by women, not simply an erosion of the quality of 
existing jobs as women enter the labor force (Elson 1996). At first blush, the existence of 
a high proportion of women working in global manufacturing industries might imply that 
women would be the primary beneficiaries of improvements in labor standards. Such a 
cursory analysis, however, ignores the position women frequently occupy in both the 
household and in the paid labor market. 
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While the employment of women keeps labor costs low and enhances a firm’s 
profitability, low-wage jobs also provide economic opportunities for women outside of 
the household and, in turn, can grant them a greater degree of choice in their lives 
(Kabeer 2000). This enhanced freedom gives women the latitude to delay marriage and 
childbearing, gain labor market experience, protect their economic options outside of the 
household, and increase their long-run earnings potential (Lim 1983). Furthermore, 
access to money income improves women’s bargaining position at home, thereby 
affecting gender dynamics and strengthening women’s influence over the distribution of 
household resources (Braunstein 2002, Sen 1990, Roldan 1988, Joekes 1987). Therefore, 
insofar as better standards reduce employment, these job losses disproportionately affect 
women, directly through a loss of wage income, but also indirectly by exacerbating other 
gender-specific inequalities. Even if the number of jobs remains unchanged, better 
employment conditions can impact women’s access to jobs. For example, there is 
evidence that as job quality improves, women’s access to these opportunities declines 
relative to men’s (Elson 1996). 
 
However, others have questioned the optimistic claim that low-wage employment 
provides an impetus for improvements in gender equality. Since women are often 
employed in globally mobile industries, an expansion of employment in these sectors 
may not raise women’s bargaining power relative to men working in less footloose 
sectors, especially during periods of economic liberalization (Seguino 2001). Along 
similar lines, a recent survey of women working in the maquiladoras of Tijuana found 
that the expansion of jobs had little impact on their ability to demand higher wages. The 
workers’ income was not significantly higher than what they could earn elsewhere, 
although maquila earnings were more stable (Fussell 2001). Survey work in Pakistan 
suggests that the availability of subcontracted work does not improve the autonomy of 
women workers when such work reinforces their marginal position in the economy. 
Furthermore, participation in the subcontracted labor market in Pakistan is often the 
result of the “push” of poverty, rather than the “pull” of securing an independent income 
(Khattak 2002). 
 
 The question of global labor standards, worker welfare, and gender dynamics 
becomes more complex when we consider the growing informalization of the low-wage 
labor market. Informalization refers to the process by which economic activities 
increasingly move into unregulated spheres. Informalization manifests itself in numerous 
ways: a growth of the informal economy relative to the formal sector; an expansion of 
temporary, contingent, and marginal jobs; an increase in the incidence of outwork (e.g. 
home-based production); and a lack of adequate enforcement for existing regulations. In 
this respect, informalization reflects the erosion of job quality and the expansion of 
flexible employment practices that has become a defining feature of the current patterns 
of global integration (Standing 1999). 
 
Recent research has documented a world-wide resurgence of informalization 
beginning in the 1970s and continuing into the 1980s and 1990s (ILO 2002, Benería 
2001, Charmes 2000, Portes et al. 1989). The fact that many countries have seen informal 
employment expand during periods of relatively stable growth supports the argument that 
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structural changes in the global economy are responsible for growing informalization. 
This stands in contrast to earlier cyclical explanations that saw a rise in informal 
employment as being directly tied to poor economic performance in the formal sector. 
 
Informalization impacts labor standards through two channels. By definition, 
informalization increases the share of workers who are not covered by existing 
regulations. More indirectly, an expansion of the informal sector can place downward 
pressure on standards in formal employment by weakening the bargaining power of 
formal sector workers. A general erosion of labor standards will be most pronounced 
when workers face a compromised fallback position. Since the supply price of labor for 
formal sector occupations depends, in part, on the income that could be earned elsewhere, 
patterns of informalization which reduce the average quality of economic alternatives 
will increase the vulnerability of employment conditions in many entry-level, formal 
sector jobs.   
 
In most countries, women account for the majority of informal sector workers 
(Benería 2001). Therefore, the process of informalization parallels the general expansion 
of low-wage employment for women. In addition, many informal sector workers face 
constraints that bar their participation in the formal labor market. For example, women 
engaged in childcare and other forms of unpaid household labor might be unable to 
participate in formal sector labor markets if the available jobs conflicted with patriarchal 
norms, the ability to perform unpaid work, or the quality of caring labor at home.2 In such 
cases, informal employment offers greater flexibility. Furthermore, there is some 
evidence that more austere macroeconomic policies, such as those associated with 
structural adjustment programs, have squeezed household resources and reduced the 
number of formal sector jobs. These conditions create an incentive for greater 
participation in informal productive activities in order to maintain household incomes 
(ILO 2002, Benería 1991,Vandemoortele 1991).  
 
 Informal employment poses important challenges for enforcing global labor 
standards. The unregulated nature of informal production reduces labor costs and gives 
the informal economy a competitive edge over formal employment arrangements. 
Raising standards in the formal sector, therefore, could displace economic activity into 
the informal sector. Indeed, the recent growth of the informal sector calls into question 
the effectiveness a purely legislative approach towards improving employment conditions 
since existing labor protections are not enforced in the informal sector. A more effective 
strategy would improve employment conditions in the formal and informal sectors 
simultaneously. This would require a partial “formalization” of informal sector activity. 
However, reversing the process of informalization has the potential of negatively 
impacting women’s access to an independent source of income. This would occur if 
formal sector jobs are disproportionately held by men, due either to labor supply 
constraints or patterns of labor market segmentation.  
 
                                                 
2    For example, Sathar and Kazi (1989) found that Pakistani households in which women worked in more 
formal factory settings had a higher incidence of child mortality than households in which women were 
engaged in paid home-base production. 
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Damned if you do: evaluating the risk of unintended consequences 
 
 Perhaps the strongest caution against global labor standards is the danger of job 
loss, particularly in developing countries with an abundance of low-wage labor and few 
alternative opportunities. This concern about jobs is not trivial. The International Labor 
Organization estimates that at the end of 2000, approximately 160 million people will be 
unemployed around the world (ILO 2001: 15-23). Furthermore, the argument that global 
labor standards will exacerbate gender inequalities is largely based on concerns that 
disemployment effects will hit women the hardest.  
 
 Labor standards reduce employment when they raise the cost of labor. Obviously, 
new standards will have no impact on employment if current practices already fulfill all 
the regulatory stipulations. Nevertheless, improvements in standards are justified 
precisely because existing conditions generally fall below a perceived threshold of 
decency. Therefore, if global labor standards are designed to have a broad social impact, 
they will likely raise labor costs. Indeed, empirical studies have shown a correlation 
between better labor standards and higher labor costs (Rodrik 1996). However, even 
when standards raise the cost of labor, these higher costs do not automatically translate 
into a substantial loss of jobs. The question of the connection between labor costs and 
jobs remains an empirical one. 
 
 In evaluating the possibility that better standards mean fewer jobs, we begin with 
a more focused question: have low-wage countries experienced faster rates of 
employment growth in labor-intensive manufacturing than high-wage countries? In 
answering this question, it is simplest to restrict attention to one sector: the manufacture 
of clothing and wearing apparel. Why clothing? First, clothing is a highly globalized, 
labor-intensive industry. Labor costs make up a large fraction of production costs and 
competitive pressures are fierce. Second, debates over global labor practices often center 
on clothing firms. For these reasons, clothing is a particularly relevant industry for this 
discussion.  
 
 A note of caution is warranted when approaching international statistics on global 
production. In most economies around the world, some production occurs in places other 
than a formal factory setting. Clandestine workshops, sizeable informal economies, and 
home-based manufacturing are often located outside of the world of formal regulations 
and official statistics. In these cases, official data will frequently fail to capture the details 
of these informal economies. Nevertheless, with this important caveat in mind, examining 
the available evidence does provide us with a clearer idea of the relationship between the 
costs of labor and employment.3 
 
 Figure 1 plots the initial level of apparel wages, expressed in U.S. dollars, against 
subsequent employment growth, expressed as the average annual growth rate, for 59 
                                                 
3    The existence of informal production that could, at relatively low cost, substitute for formal production 
would tend to increase the observed responsiveness of employment to labor costs in the formal sector since 
labor could be displaced into the informal sector. 
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countries for which comparable data are available.4 The initial wage level is measured as 
a three-year average, centered on 1982, in order to smooth the distortions that could be 
introduced by exchange rate fluctuations in any given year. Employment growth reflects 
the 15-year period, 1982 to 1996. The figure shows a clear negative relationship between 
initial wage levels and subsequent employment growth. The estimated regression line 
running through the observations has a statistically significant negative slope (p-value < 
0.0001) – every additional $1,000 in initial wages is associated with an estimated 1.25 
decline in the average annual growth rate of employment. 
 
Figure 1 
Initial 1982 wage levels ($US) and subsequent employment  
growth, 1982-96, in the apparel sectors of 59 countries. 
 
Sources: UNDIO, Industrial Statistics Database 2001. World Bank, World Development Indicators 2001. 
 
 
 
The pattern of global clothing production appears to match the predictions of 
international trade theorists: countries with an abundance of low-wage labor have seen 
employment in their clothing sectors expand as markets have become more integrated. 
However, the relationships between initial wage rates and subsequent employment 
                                                 
4    Data are taken from the United National Industrial Development Organization (UNIDO), Industrial 
Statistics Database 3-digit ISIC CD-ROM 2001 and the World Bank, World Development Indicators CD-
ROM 2001. 
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growth show a great deal of variation – countries with nearly identical initial wages 
demonstrate very different patterns of employment growth. More importantly, the 
relationships in Figure 1 do not tell us whether reasonable improvements in wages and 
working conditions in a particular country will always lead to job losses. For example, 
what would happen to employment if wages (and other components of labor costs) were 
to gradually improve in a low-wage country? 
 
 In order to gauge to what extent changes in real wages impact employment, a 
panel data set covering 49 countries over the years 1981 to 1996 was assembled using the 
same data sources as were used to construct Figure 1.  This dataset included annual 
measurements of employment, real wages, and real output for the apparel industries in 
the countries for which complete data were available. All variables were expressed in 
natural logarithms. Using the general method of moments (GMM) technique developed 
by Arellano and Bond (1991) for the estimation of dynamic panels, the following model 
was estimated in which employment (Ei,t) is expressed as a function of real wages (wi,t) , 
real output (yi,t) , and country-specific effects (νi): 
 
  Ei,t = α + δEi,t-1 + βxwi,t-x + γxyi,t-x + νi + µi,t, for x = 0 …1 
 
Lags of one and two years were included for the wage and output variables. The GMM 
estimation for dynamic panels involves expressing the equation in first-differences. Since 
wages and output cannot be taken as strictly exogenous, lagged values for these variables, 
expressed in levels, were used as instruments in the estimation. 
 
 The results are presented in Table 1. Note that both one-step and two-step GMM 
estimations are presented. While the two-step procedure can achieve some efficiency 
gains, standard errors may be underestimated. Therefore, the one-step results can be more 
reliable for drawing inferences about the coefficient estimates.  
 
 What do these results imply? First, Wald tests show that the sum of the 
coefficients on the wage variables and the output variables are statistically significant and 
have the expected signs – that is, increases in real wages have a negative impact on 
employment while increases in real output have a positive impact.5 In interpreting the 
results, it is helpful to summarize the estimates in a more user-friendly fashion. For 
example, from these results, we can develop long-run estimates of the impact of changes 
in real wages and output on employment. These calculations, based on the two-step 
GMM procedure, are presented in Table 2. Because all variables were expressed in 
logarithm form, these coefficients can be interpreted as elasticity estimates. 
 
 
 
                                                 
5   For the one-step GMM estimators, the Wald test of the null hypothesis that the coefficients were not 
satistically different from zero yielded a test statistic for the real wage variables of  χ2(2)=75.51 (p-
value<0.001) and a test statistic for the real output variables of χ2(3)=180.53 (p-value<0.001). The Wald 
test of the null hypothesis that the sum of the coefficients were equal to zero yielded a test statistics of 
χ2(1)=48.96 for real wages and χ2(1)=74.05 for real output. Therefore, we can reject the null hypotheses.   
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Table 1. GMM estimates of dynamic labor demand equations for the 
apparel industries of 49 countries, 1981-96, n=686, t-statistics in parentheses. 
 
Variable Lag (1) One-step (2) Two-step 
Employment Ei,t-1 
 
0.6060 
(14.24) 
 
0.6073 
(29.41) 
Real wages wi,t 
 
-0.3789 
(-7.51) 
 
-0.3779 
(-21.01) 
 wi,t-1 
 
0.1266 
(2.59) 
 
0.1379 
(16.52) 
Real output yi,t 
 
0.4854 
(12.55) 
 
0.4924 
(51.09) 
 yi,t-1 
 
-0.1466 
(-3.23) 
 
-0.1543 
(-11.93) 
Constant 
 
-0.0038 
(-3.42) 
 
-0.0034 
(-9.79) 
Wald χ-squared (all coefficients) 
 
1774.56 
 
27684.79 
Sargan autocorrelation test -8.79 
(p-value<0.001) 
-2.81 
(p-value=0.0049) 
 
 How do we interpret these results? The long-run coefficient on real wages is -
0.611. This means that a 10% increase in real wages would be associated with a 6.1% 
decrease in employment, other factors remaining constant. Likewise, a 10% increase in 
output is associated with a 8.6% increase in employment. Therefore, holding other factors 
constant, including unobserved country-specific effects, an increase in real wages does 
appear to have a negative impact on employment in the apparel sector. However, the 
response is inelastic – that is, the decrease in employment is of a lesser magnitude than 
the increase in real wages.  
 
 These econometric estimates are based on the assumption that other factors 
remain constant when real wages change. What happens when other factors are allowed 
to change along with wages? Can wages alone explain a significant portion of the 
variations in the growth rate of employment in this context?   
 
Table 2. Elasticity of labor demand estimates, 
long run estimates based on the results in Table 1 
Variable Long-run coefficient estimate 
Real wages -0.611 
Real output 0.861 
 
 
When we look at the simple relationship between changes in employment and 
changes in real wages, without controlling for other influences, we do not find a clear-cut 
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relationship. Figure 2 graphs average annual changes in employment against average 
annual changes in real wages from 1982 to 1996. The data do not support a model that 
reduces the determinants of employment to a single variable – the change in the real 
wage rate – even for a highly globalized, labor-intensive industry such as apparel 
manufacturing. If other factors – such as prices, productivity, or consumer demand – 
adjust appropriately when wages increase, space can be created to accommodate better 
standards without generating welfare-reducing job losses (Pollin, Burns, and Heintz 
2001).6  
 
Figure 2 
Average annual % change in real wages and employment 
in the apparel sector of 52 countries, 1982-96. 
Sources: UNDIO, Industrial Statistics Database 2001. World Bank, World Development Indicators 2001. 
 
An ILO (2000a: 43) study on the global garment and textile industries reaches 
similar conclusions: “Labor costs remain an important cost factor, particularly in labor-
intensive production such as footwear and clothing. Nevertheless … they are no longer a 
decisive factor in determining competitiveness on world markets.” Similarly, research 
into the impact of changes in the minimum wage on poverty rates in developing countries 
has shown that higher minimum wages reduce poverty, although the impact may not 
extend to very poor households that do not participate in the paid labor force (Saget 2001, 
Lustig and McLeod 1997). This evidence does not suggest that improvements in labor 
                                                 
6    Pollin, Burns, and Heintz (2001) produce a chart similar to Figure 2 covering a slightly shorter time 
period. They also trace a significant wage increase through the commodity chain to determine its effect on 
retail prices. 
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standards have no impact on employment, but it casts doubt on the argument that better 
standards leave workers worse off on average.  
 
To sum up: the impact of labor costs on employment cannot simply be dismissed 
as unimportant or trivial. However, empirical research suggests that a carefully designed 
system for implementing global labor standards that allows for other adjustments when 
labor costs increase can reduce (or possibly eliminate) the risk of job loss and can be 
welfare-enhancing for those workers the policies aim to help.  
 
 
Strategies for implementation: a brief history 
 
 Despite the potential a system of labor standards possesses for raising the well-
being of wage earners around the world, designing and implementing an appropriate set 
of institutions to realize this goal remains a significant challenge. A review of the past 
strategies put forward by social reformers and the consequent institutional changes that 
have occurred helps set the stage for a discussion of current efforts to realize a 
coordinated approach to labor standards.  
 
Early support for international labor standards first emerged in the 19th century. 
Advocates included Robert Owen, the Scottish industrialist and utopian thinker; Charles 
Hindley, a British member of parliament from 1835 to 1857; and Daniel Legrand, a 
prominent manufacturer from Alsace. As early as 1818, Owen was suggesting that the 
governments of continental Europe should implement a system of labor standards to 
improve conditions among Europe’s working classes (Lorenz 2001: 41). Foreshadowing 
today’s “race to the bottom” arguments, Hindley argued that international standards 
would prevent competitive pressures from eroding working conditions in Britain – in 
particular, lengthening the working day (Follows 1951). In a similar vein, Legrand 
promoted international labor legislation for Europe in the mid-19th century (Follows 
1951). Legrand was strongly influenced by the Christian socialist tradition which 
advocated for reforming capitalism to produce humane social outcomes while 
condemning as heresies the demands of more radical socialist movements (Gide and Rist 
1948: 514-44, Lorenz 2001: 41-4). 
 
The work of these early proponents of international labor standards paved the way 
for the establishment of the International Labor Organization (ILO) in 1919 at the 
Versailles Peace Conference. After the turmoil of World War I, the creation of the ILO 
was seen as an important initiative to maintain peace, social stability, and shared 
prosperity in the world.7 In 1946, the ILO became the first specialized agency of the 
United Nations (UN) and represents the only institution created by the Treaty of 
Versailles to survive today. It is also the only UN agency in which non-government 
organizations play a large institutionalized role in formulating policy.  
 
                                                 
7    See the 1919 Constitution of the ILO, especially the Preamble, for an eloquent justification for the 
founding of the organization.  
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The ILO operates by creating conventions that address a range of labor market 
policies through a process of stakeholder negotiations (in general, business, labor, and 
government). The ILO then attempts to persuade governments to ratify the conventions, 
with the understanding that ratification implies that domestic legislation will be adjusted, 
when necessary, to comply with the conventions. Of all the conventions developed by the 
ILO, eight are deemed “core conventions” covering four key areas of basic human rights: 
freedom of association and collective bargaining, the abolition of forced labor, the 
elimination of child labor, and non-discrimination.  
 
While the ILO has had a significant impact on improving labor standards around 
the world, its approach has limitations. Ratification of an ILO convention does not 
guarantee enforcement of the standards in question. In many cases, the capacity to 
enforce labor laws is lacking and widespread abuses are common. In addition, 
membership in the ILO is not conditional on ratification of the core conventions. For 
example, both China and the United States have only ratified two of the eight core 
conventions. Finally, with the growth of multinational production systems, a strategy 
aimed at influencing national policy on a case-by-case basis could be misdirected. 
Greater capital mobility and increased subcontracting mean that individual regulatory 
regimes are under pressure to relax controls or risk losing job-creating investments. 
 
 In reaction to the growing internationalization of economic activity, influential 
global organizations began to develop corporate codes of conduct in an effort to regulate 
the actions of multinationals. The UN took the lead and, in 1974, established the Center 
on Transnational Corporations (UNCTC), which began developing a comprehensive code 
of conduct for multinational corporations covering many aspects of corporate behavior, 
including labor practices (United Nations 1986). The OECD launched its own 
Declaration on International Investment and Multinational Enterprises in 1976, which 
also set up a framework for governing corporate actions (OECD 2000). In 1977, the ILO 
followed suit, with its Tripartite Declaration of Principles Concerning Multinational 
Enterprises and Social Policy which focused more directly on labor issues (ILO 2000b). 
 
 These codes attempted to develop a universal set of standards that were to be 
sensitive to a country’s level of development; they were meant to apply to all 
multinationals; and they were developed by prominent international organizations. 
However, not one has been implemented in a meaningful way. Despite several drafts, the 
UN code was never ratified and the Center on Transnational Corporations disappeared 
completely in 1993, having been incorporated into the United Nations Conference on 
Trade and Development, or UNCTAD (Jenkins 2001). While the OECD and ILO codes 
achieved a higher level of consensus, there was no comprehensive plan for 
implementation, monitoring, or enforcement. Compliance was voluntary, but the codes 
contained few, if any, incentives to encourage firms to change their practices.  
 
Moreover, in the 1980s the global policy climate began to shift. Instead of 
questioning the behavior of multinationals, many developing nations emphasized the 
need to attract a growing share of foreign investment. In this context of a new neoliberal, 
market-oriented ideology, the ILO had trouble expanding its base of national 
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governments that have ratified its more recent conventions extending protections into 
areas such as health and safety, let alone enforcing rules governing the behavior of 
multinationals (Pearson and Seyfang 2001). The ultimate outcome was that these early 
efforts to regulate global corporate behavior failed to deliver (Tsogas 2001: 61-2). 
 
  As these first codes of conduct faded into obscurity, there was little to replace 
them until the 1990s. However, growing public awareness over sweatshop practices and 
human rights violations among the suppliers to brand-name manufacturers prompted the 
development of a new type of corporate code of conduct. These new codes were created 
by the multinationals themselves in response to the increasingly public accusations of 
profit-hungry corporations turning a blind eye to labor abuses. In 1991, Levi-Strauss & 
Co. became the first brand-name corporation in this new wave of social responsibility to 
adopt a code of conduct. Many other U.S. and European companies followed suit. 
Literally hundreds of different codes currently exist. Because these codes were developed 
with little coordination, there is an enormous amount of variation from one code to the 
next (Kolk, van Tulder, and Welters 1999).  
 
 These corporate codes of conduct have numerous shortcomings. First, they suffer 
from the “fox in the chicken coop” problem – corporations have an incentive to minimize 
the damage of a negative report by limiting the number of monitored suppliers or by 
restricting what information is made public. Second, they frequently pay scant attention 
to issues of implementation. Developing a code of conduct for public relations purposes 
receives much more attention than insuring that the standards are actually implemented. 
Third, because of the variation in the content of the codes, consumers find it difficult to 
determine what compliance with a code of conduct really means. For the producers of the 
goods, the existence of multiple codes increases the difficulty of compliance. Many 
subcontractors accept jobs from different multinationals, each with a different code of 
conduct (Kemp 2001). Often producers opt for the lowest common denominator and 
follow the codes that are easiest to implement. 
 
 In recent years, an alternative proposal for implementing global labor standards – 
the introduction of a “social clause” into the current system of multilateral trade 
regulations – has created substantial controversy. The proposed policy would explicitly 
tie labor practices to the rules governing international trade. The social clause would 
allow trade sanctions to be directed at countries in which substandard labor practices 
exist (Caire 1994). Theoretically, a social clause would prevent countries from engaging 
in practices such as “social dumping” that would trigger a race to the bottom – for 
example, securing a competitive advantage from labor abuses or lax environmental 
protections. While the social clause was first framed within the context of the General 
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), today’s debate focuses on the World Trade 
Organzation (WTO), GATT’s successor. Proponents argue that the WTO is the 
appropriate international organization for enforcing global labor standards. In a variation 
on this theme, others have argued that the enforcement of a social clause should be a joint 
responsibility of the ILO and the WTO (Ehrenberg 1996).  
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The idea of a social clause has frequently been criticized for its potential to be 
used as a tool for disguised protectionism. Since it imposes trade sanctions on the 
offending country, the penalties could harm export workers in developing countries, 
making them worse off than they would have been without a social clause. Others have 
questioned whether the WTO is the appropriate institution for addressing labor standards. 
In particular, some have argued that introducing a social clause into the WTO would lead 
to inefficient negotiations, since it requires the simultaneous determination of domestic 
and international policies (Brown 2001). In addition, the social clause sanctions a 
particular state for abuses found in a transnational production chain. It is unclear whether 
punishments directed at the national government and industries of a particular country are 
always the most appropriate measures for enforcing labor standards in the context of 
global production. 
 
 
Commodity chains and global standards 
 
 The relationship between globalized production and a system of labor standards is 
best understood within the context of the global commodity chain. The global commodity 
chain refers to the way in which the production, distribution, and sales of goods is 
organized across national borders. Global commodity chain analysis has been developed 
in the work of Gary Gereffi (1994) and others as a means of understanding the 
organization and influence of different players in global production systems. For 
example, a commodity chain for the production of a pair of sports shoes includes the 
subcontractor which actually assembles the shoes, the intermediary (or “jobber”) which 
coordinates production among a network of subcontractors, the brand-name multinational 
which designs the shoe and builds the brand image, and the retailer which ultimately sells 
the shoe to the consumer.  
 
 The labor-intensive production of many consumer goods (e.g. clothing, 
electronics, or footwear) is often characterized by buyer-driven commodity chains in 
which large retailers or brand-name corporations set up and influence a decentralized 
system of production and distribution.8 Market power differs dramatically among the 
different players along the chain. The actual production is subcontracted out to small 
firms which generally face extremely competitive conditions (Gereffi 1994, Bonacich 
and Appelbaum 2000). Therefore, subcontractors cannot easily raise the price of their 
output without risking a loss of business. On the other hand, retailers and brand-name 
multinationals enjoy some degree of market power which they can use to keep prices low 
for the goods they purchase or to earn rents through the development of monopolistic 
brand identities. 
 
 Since subcontractors face intense competition, focusing adjustment strategies on 
these firms is likely either to fail completely or to produce the type of unintended 
                                                 
8    Buyer-driven commodity chains can be contrasted with producer driven commodity chains in which 
large industrial enterprises set up the system of global production. The relatively capital-intensive 
manufacture of automobiles, aircraft, and electrical machinery can be thought of as examples of producer-
driven commodity chains.  
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consequences previously discussed. However, brand-name manufacturers and large 
retailers could use their market power to implement improvements in labor standards at 
the level of production by compensating subcontractors for the cost increases. For 
example, they could raise retail prices modestly and pass these revenues back to finance 
the improvements in employment conditions. Unintended job losses would be avoided 
since subcontractors who complied with the standards would receive the resources 
necessary to implement the improvements. 
 
 A study of the possibility of financing workplace improvements in Mexico 
through such a scheme found that a 2-6 percent increase in the final U.S. retail price 
could finance a 100 percent increase in production worker wages for a variety of different 
garments (Pollin, Burns, and Heintz 2001). The magnitude of this price increase falls well 
below the amount that consumers have said they would be willing to pay to insure that 
their clothes are not produced under sweatshop conditions (see, for example, Elliot and 
Freeman 2000). Therefore, by making adjustments in the upper segments of a global 
commodity chain, resources can be generated for financing substantial changes in 
working conditions at the point of production. Furthermore, since profits of large retailers 
and brand-name producers depend on the careful cultivation of their brand images and 
corporate reputations, an association with substandard labor practices could damage 
profitability. Similarly, a good reputation with respect to labor standards would enhance a 
company’s competitive position.  
 
 
Standardized codes of conduct for multinational commodity chains 
 
 In a departure from other approaches to global labor standards, there has been a 
movement towards establishing a standardized code of conduct, with independent 
monitoring and enforcement, to implement labor standards across entire commodity 
chains. Examples of organizations embracing this approach include the Fair Labor 
Assocation (U.S.), the Ethical Trading Initiative (U.K.), the Clean Clothes Campaign 
(Europe), Social Accountability International (U.S.), and the Worker’s Rights 
Consortium (U.S.). With these approaches, multinational firms insure that labor practices 
meet a common set of standards across all their suppliers. These standards include issues 
of health and safety, hours of work, human rights, freedom of association, wages, and 
discrimination. A process of independent verification through factory inspections and 
visits to production sites – including informal sector producers – insures that the code has 
been implemented. Firms that meet the basic standards can use this seal of approval in 
their marketing and promotion strategies. Substandard labor practices that are not 
corrected are publicized with the result that the reputation and brand-image of the 
company in question suffers.  
 
While these independent monitoring and certification organizations avoid many 
of the problems associated with corporate codes of conduct, certain constraints remain. 
Many limit themselves to one particular market or one particular industry (e.g. the 
university logo market or the apparel industry). There is no universal code of conduct and 
substantial variations among the established codes persist. Furthermore, many rely on 
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professional auditors with little or no experience with the countries and communities 
involved. Finally, participation is voluntary. Therefore, compliance depends to a large 
extent on the strength of the incentives created.   
 
These limitations can be addressed in a number of ways. Borrowing a page from 
the earliest codes of conduct, a single enforcement agency to monitor multinational 
behavior could be housed in a well-established international organization, such as the 
ILO. Of course, additional resources would need to be channeled to the agency for 
operational support – through fees paid by member corporations, an expanded budget for 
the international institution, or a combination of sources. Furthermore, the enforcement 
agency could establish a network of NGOs, trade unions, and informal sector 
organizations to develop a mechanism of lodging complaints and grievances. A subset of 
the local non-governmental and labor organizations could also be encouraged to undergo 
training to serve as external auditors in the certification program. Such an arrangement 
would take into account relationships across the global commodity chain while providing 
space for influence from domestic organizations.   
 
 
Limitations of global labor standards 
 
 Regardless of the implementation strategy, the limitations of any scheme along 
these lines to introduce global labor standards should be explicitly recognized. Most 
significantly, only a subset of the world’s workforce would receive any benefits, since the 
standards are aimed at workers who produce goods for export. Workers producing non-
traded goods and services would not be directly affected by interventions such as a 
standardized code of conduct or a social clause. In these cases, the on-going mission of 
the ILO to encourage states to implement and enforce better domestic standards remains 
invaluable. The state must retain, and indeed strengthen, its role as enforcer of standards, 
despite the limitations imposed by a heightened degree of global integration and 
interdependency.   
 
Furthermore, adopting expansionary macroeconomic policies could prove to be a 
more effective strategy for improving the well-being of all workers and securing 
egalitarian outcomes than the enforcement of targeted labor standards. This raises the 
question of whether labor standards are the correct policy intervention during a period in 
which the growth rates of the world economy have fallen. Raising growth rates would 
require a coordinated move away from the austerity programs and stabilization packages 
of the neoliberal era and towards an expansionary alternative. Many of the protests over 
the consequences of raising labor standards would become irrelevant within the context 
of a global expansion. Most significantly, trade-offs – such as “more jobs versus better 
jobs” or “jobs for the North versus jobs for the South” – would no longer be binding 
(Singh and Zammit 2001). 
 
However, caution must be exercised when shifting the emphasis away from labor 
standards and towards expansionary macroeconomic policy. While appropriate 
macroeconomic policies can contribute to improvements in the conditions of work, they 
  19
might not be sufficient to wholly address the widespread erosion of the quality of 
employment opportunities that has been observed around the globe. For example, the 
process of informalization has continued apace even in economies boasting respectable 
levels of economic growth. This means that an increasing share of the labor force of these 
countries will not have access to basic social protections, despite solid records of growth. 
While higher levels of growth might slow the process of informalization, additional 
interventions will likely be needed in order to reverse the decline in social protection 
(Heintz and Pollin 2002).  
 
Of course, posing the issue as a choice between changes in the macroeconomic 
policy regime or the implementation of a system of global standards unduly limits the 
options available. The two strategies are not necessarily mutually exclusive. A 
coordinated approach involving a range of interventions – both macroeconomic and in 
terms of targeted international regulations – would be the most effective means of 
improving economic outcomes for individuals engaged in paid labor worldwide. 
 
 
Conclusions 
 
Despite the limitations of global labor standards, the potential that such 
interventions have for improving the working lives of a significant number of people 
should not be underestimated. Furthermore, the possible impact of such a system extends 
well beyond the benefits generated by its core policies. The development of an 
appropriate regulatory scheme for enforcing basic standards of decency could serve as a 
model for governing multinational economic activities more generally. Because of these 
possible contributions, striving to create an effective framework for global labor 
standards represents an important policy goal in this era of internationalized production 
and consumption. 
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